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JANE DOE V ABC AND MEDIA LIABILITY FOR DISCLOSING 




I   INTRODUCTION 
 
It was long believed that Victoria Park Racing and Recreation Grounds Co Ltd v Taylor1 
was authority for the proposition that Australian law knew no cause of action that 
specifically protected personal privacy. However, in 2001 the High Court of Australia in 
Australian Broadcasting Corp v Lenah Game Meats Pty Ltd2 rejected such thinking.  
Nevertheless, the court stopped short of actually recognising such a claim.  Whilst several 
judges discussed developments in privacy in England and the United States, only 
Callinan J could be said to have supported recognition of a new cause of action.3  The 
most that could be said of ABC v Lenah Games Meats, therefore, is that it removed what 
was believed to be the main obstacle to the development of a tort offering protection 
against invasion of privacy and accordingly opened the door to recognition of such a 
claim in an appropriate case. 
 
In the Queensland District Court case Grosse v Purvis4 Skoien SJDC took what he 
acknowledged was a “bold step” in accepting that invitation.  This case involved a claim 
by a plaintiff against her former lover who had been stalking her.  This included loitering 
near her places of residence, work and recreation; instances of unauthorised entry to her 
house and yard; offensive telephone calls and the use of offensive language and 
behaviour to her, her friends and colleagues.  The plaintiff’s case relied on a number of 
                                                  
∗
 Professor of Law, Faculty of Law, Queensland University of Technology. 
1
 (1937) 58 CLR 479, 496, 521. 
2
 (2001) 208 CLR 199. 
3
 (2001) 208 CLR 199, 327-8. 
4
 [2003] Aust Torts Reports ¶81-706. See also D Butler, ‘Personal Privacy: Boldly Going Where No 
Australian Court Has Gone Before’ (2003) 24 Queensland Lawyer 72 (Part I), (2004) 25 Queensland 
Lawyer 183 (Part II). 
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causes of action, including trespass and intentional infliction of psychiatric harm.  While 
certain elements of the behaviour were found to have satisfied these torts, overall the 
defendant’s behaviour was held to have amounted to an intrusion upon the privacy or 
seclusion of the plaintiff, in a manner which would be considered highly offensive to a 
reasonable person of ordinary sensibilities, which caused the plaintiff detriment in the 
form of mental, psychological or emotional harm or distress or which prevented or 
hindered the plaintiff from doing an act which she was lawfully entitled to do.  
Substantial damages were therefore awarded. 
 
This finding reflected one of the four forms of privacy tort recognised in the United 
States – namely that concerning “unreasonable intrusions”.5  His Honour did not need to 
make reference to the other three manifestations of privacy that have been recognised by 
American courts – that is, public disclosure of private facts, display of the plaintiff in a 
false light to the public, and appropriation of another’s name or likeness.6 
 
In April 2007 Hampel J in the Victorian County Court case Jane Doe v Australian 
Broadcasting Corporation7 took another bold step in the area of privacy protection, this 
time in relation to the disclosure of private facts.  However, this was not the only 
noteworthy aspect of her Honour’s judgment.  Indeed, in upholding the plaintiff's claim 
for compensation she also based her decision on three alternative grounds, each of which 
in its own way represented a bold step. 
 
II   THE FACTS 
 
Jane Doe v Australian Broadcasting Corporation8 concerned a 27 year old woman who 
was twice raped by her estranged husband.  As a consequence, she suffered post 
traumatic stress disorder.  Although her symptoms were chronic, in the time leading up to 
                                                  
5
 See Restatement (Second) of Torts §652B. 
6
 Restatement (Second) of Torts §652C-652E. 
7
 [2007] VCC 281. 
8
 Ibid. 
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the trial of her husband a year later she had made substantial progress in improvement of 
her condition.  Her husband was convicted and sentenced to a period of imprisonment.  
That afternoon in its 4.00 pm, 5.00 pm and 6.00 pm news bulletins ABC radio news 
reported on the sentencing of the husband and the offences of which he was convicted, 
which were described as rapes within marriage.  The reports also reveal the offences as 
having occurred in the plaintiff's home and named the suburb, and in one broadcast also 
revealed the plaintiff's name and identified her as the victim.   
 
The ABC journalist and sub-editor responsible for these reports were subsequently 
charged with an offence under Judicial Proceedings Act 1958, s 4(1A) for publishing 
information identifying a victim of a sexual offence.  Both pleaded guilty.  The 
broadcasts had a devastating impact upon the plaintiff.  Expert evidence was given that 
the broadcasts significantly worsened the plaintiff's symptoms of post traumatic stress 
disorder.  The broadcast had been heard by many of her friends and acquaintances who 
had not known of the original attacks and she received many phone calls and inquiries.  
She became more withdrawn and was unable to engage in ordinary social contact for two 
years. 
 
The plaintiff commenced action against the ABC, the journalist and the sub-editor 
seeking damages based on four separate causes of action: breach of statutory duty, 
negligence, breach of confidentiality and breach of privacy.  In the final result, Hampel J 
found all four causes of action to have been established and awarded damages in an 
amount just over $234,000.  The ABC has now lodged an appeal.9 
 
III   FOUR BOLD STEPS? 
 
Hampel J upheld the claim on the basis of all four pleaded grounds.  However, on 
analysis her reasoning seems stronger in relation to some than others.  Nevertheless, in 
                                                  
9
 ‘ABC Appeal on Privacy Payout’ Herald Sun 18 April 2007. 
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one way or another her findings on all four claims may also be seen as involving “bold 
steps.”  
 
A Breach of Statutory Duty 
 
In a rare case a statute that imposes a duty may also allow a person who is intended to 
benefit from performance of that duty to bring an action for compensation in the event 
that the duty is breached.  As Brennan CJ, Dawson and Toohey JJ stated in Byrne v 
Australian Airlines:  
 
 A cause of action for damages for breach of statutory duty arises where a statute which 
imposes an obligation for the protection or benefit of a particular class of persons is, upon 
its proper construction, intended to provide a ground of civil liability when the breach of 
the obligation causes injury or damage of a kind against which the statute was designed 
to afford protection.10 
 
Ultimately it is a question of construction of the statute.  A particular difficulty may be 
where a statute imposes a criminal penalty, since it may be inferred that the legislature 
intended for the criminal penalty to be sufficient punishment for transgression without 
also imposing civil liability.11  Section 4(1A) is such a provision.  However, the existence 
of a criminal sanction is not conclusive.12   
 
Hampel J considered s 4(1A) to be a provision which imposes an obligation for the 
protection or benefit of a particular class of persons, in the form of victims of sexual 
offences.13 It followed that if a victim was identified in breach of the obligation not to 
publish, and suffered injury loss or damage as a result of being wrongfully identified, 
such injury or damage was capable of constituting injury or damage ‘of a kind against 
                                                  
10
 (1995) 185 CLR 410, 424. 
11
 Sovar v Henry Lane Pty Ltd (1067) 116 CLR 397, 404. 
12
 Byrne v Australian Airlines (1995) 185 CLR 410. 
13
 See also Hinch v DPP [1996] 1 VR 683, 689. 
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which the statute was designed to afford protection’.14  This was a case unlike, for 
example, regulatory or welfare legislation which imposed a general administrative 
function on public bodies and involved the exercise of administrative discretions, which 
may be seen as being passed for the benefit of society as a whole as opposed to a specific 
statutory duty passed for the benefit of specific individuals.15   Accordingly, the plaintiff 
was held to have a personal right to the due observance of s 4(1A) and a personal right to 
sue for damages if injured by a contravention of that right, as occurred here. 
 
Hampel J’s decision is the first to recognise that a civil claim for breach of statutory duty 
may be established in cases involving breach of a statutory prohibition against 
publication of identifying details of victims of sexual offences.  These statutory 
prohibitions are well known in media circles and the decision sounds a salient warning 
that a failure to observe the duty thereby imposed a result in not only criminal sanction 
but also substantial civil liability in the event that loss or damage results from a 
publication in breach of the prohibition. 
 
B Negligence – Breach of Duty of Care 
 
To the extent that the publications were in breach of a specific statutory prohibition and 
resulted in personal injuries, the decision might have been viewed as having a limited 
impact.  However, of perhaps wider significance was the finding by Hampel J that the 
publication also amounted to a breach of a common law duty of care.  Much of the 
media’s attention following the decision related to recognition of a cause of action for 
breach of privacy.  The potential of such a cause of action is a matter of present concern 
to the media.   
 
Jane Doe v ABC is also the first case in the Commonwealth to recognise that the media 
may in certain circumstances owe a duty of care to members of the public.  Previously, 
                                                  
14
 [2007] VCC 281, [74]. 
15
 Cf X (Minors) v Bedfordshire County Council [1995] 2 AC 663. 
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the closest to such recognition of a duty of care was a Canadian case in which two 
dissenting judges suggested that the media could owe a duty of care in relation to the 
compiling of a story.16  In such a case, they thought that the content of the duty would be 
an obligation to take reasonable care in the investigating and writing of the story, as 
opposed to a duty to get the facts right.  In Australia, Levine J in GS v News Ltd17 was not 
prepared to strike out a claim for breach of duty of care where a plaintiff claimed to have 
suffered psychological harm after being chased down a street by the media after 
appearing at a tribunal hearing. 
 
A number of considerations may be relevant when considering whether a duty of care is 
owed in a particular case.18  The defendants argued that if the plaintiff had suffered 
damage as the result of a broadcast which identified her as a victim of rape then any 
remedy should be determined under the laws of defamation, which provide for an 
appropriate balance for free speech. Recognition of a duty of care would therefore 
introduce incoherence into the law by encroaching upon that balance.19 However, as 
Hampel J found, the coherence argument did not apply in the case at hand because the 
plaintiff was not suing for damage to her reputation.  Instead, the plaintiff’s complaint 
was that the defendants published information which identified her, in the face of the 
statutory prohibition on publication of such information.  Her claim was for the loss of 
the right not to have her identity published, and the psychiatric harm flowing from the 
publication of information identifying her.20  
 
As such, the case properly fell to be decided under the principles governing recovery for 
psychiatric injury, as decided in Tame v New South Wales.21  In this case the court 
                                                  
16
 Guay v Sun Publishing Co [1953] 4 DLR 577 (Rinfred CJC and Cartwright J). 
17
  (1998) Aust Torts Reports 81-466. 
18
 See D Butler and S Rodrick, Australian Media Law (3rd ed, 2007), [11.20]. 
19
 Her Honour considered Sullivan v Moody (2001) 207 CLR 562; Tame v New South Wales (2002) 211 
CLR 317.  Other relevant cases include Sattin v Nationwide News Pty Ltd (1996) 39 NSWLR 32, 42; Gould 
v TCN Channel 9 [2000] NSWSC 707, [27]; Gacic v John Fairfax Publications Pty Limited [2005] 
NSWSC 1210, [49]. 
20
 [2007] VCC 218, [64], [84]. 
21
 (2002) 211 CLR 317. 
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emphasised the importance of reasonableness when defining the ambit of a person’s duty 
of care towards others.  This involves an evaluation of the nature of the relationship 
between the parties, and the nature of the activity engaged in by the alleged tortfeasor, as 
well as the nature of the harm suffered by the victim, in order to determine whether a 
duty of care exists.22  Her Honour held that: 
In my view, there was a relationship here between the plaintiff and the 
defendants, other than that of broadcaster and member of the public. The 
relationship here was one between persons under an obligation not to publish 
information identifying a victim of a sexual assault, and a victim entitled to the 
protection from publication of identifying information conferred on them by the 
operation of s.4(1A).23  
 
Since the ABC was a national broadcaster whose statutory functions include broadcasting 
news and information concerning current events, and the duties of journalist and sub-
editor were to file reports for broadcasting and deciding what was broadcast respectively, 
there was a higher obligation on them not to publish information in breach of the 
statutory prohibition than might exist with a private citizen who is not in the business of 
broadcasting, and who did not have the capacity to spread the information as widely as 
the defendants could.  Further, it was reasonable to expect the defendants to contemplate 
harm of the kind alleged by the plaintiff could result from a publication of information 
identifying a victim published in breach of the statutory prohibition. Hampel J suggested 
that this was “because of the violating nature of sexual assault, the well-known and oft 
recorded effects that sexual assault can have on victims” and the reasonable expectation 
victims have, as a result of the statutory prohibition, that their identity will not be 
published.24  Accordingly, there was in each case a sufficient relationship between the 
plaintiff and defendant to create a duty of care on the part of each of the defendants.  
                                                  
22
 [2007] VCC 218, [86]. 
23
 Ibid [92]. 
24
 Ibid [98]-[99]. 
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Moreover, there had been a clear and culpable breach by each of the defendants to take 
reasonable care not to identify the plaintiff.25  
 
This recognition of a duty of care on the part of the media towards a member of the 
community is potentially a significant one in light of the wide variety of circumstances in 
which individual members of the public could arguably be in specific contemplation of 
the media as being at risk of harm as a result of a publication or broadcast.26 
 
C Breach of Confidence 
 
The difficulties confronting an Australian plaintiff seeking to rely on breach of 
confidence to obtain compensation for revelation of private facts were shown by the 
Victorian Supreme Court case Giller v Procopets.27 In that case the female plaintiff 
claimed (inter alia) that she suffered distress and humiliation as a result of the defendant, 
her former partner, showing and threatening to distribute a video of them engaging in 
sexual activities. The plaintiff relied on three separate causes of action: breach of 
confidence, intentional infliction of mental harm and breach of privacy, but Gillard J of 
the Victorian Supreme Court dismissed all three claims.  In relation to the claim for 
breach of confidence, his Honour accepted that the persons engaging in a sexual activity 
in the privacy of their home involved a relationship of mutual trust and confidence, but 
stressed that it was an equitable action. Accordingly, he held that general damages for 
physical or mental injury, distress or upset were not available because they were common 
law remedies. While it was true that the Victorian equivalent of Lord Cairns’ Act allowed 
equitable damages to be granted in lieu of the equitable remedies of specific performance 
or injunction, in this case the plaintiff had only sought damages and not an injunction.  
 
In Jane Doe v Australian Broadcasting Corporation  Hampel J noted that “breach of 
                                                  
25
 Ibid [96]. 
26
 See Butler and Rodrick, above n 16, Chapter 11. 
27
 [2004] VSC 113. 
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confidence claims have expanded in their reach in recent years” and that there had been 
“considerable judicial scrutiny, particularly in United Kingdom”.28  Whilst 
acknowledging that care needed to be taken because these cases had been decided in light 
of the Human Rights Act 1988 and the requirement that English courts take into account 
so far as possible the European Convention on Human Rights, her Honour regarded that 
the parts of the United Kingdom decisions she relied on “all concern the common law 
development of breach of confidence and breach of privacy causes of action”.29  She 
further ventured, after reference to Gleeson CJ’s suggestion in ABC v Lenah Game Meats 
that Australia might follow the English approach to breach of confidence as the 
appropriate cause of action for breach of privacy, to hold that the English approach as 
also representing the common law development of breach of confidence in Australia.30  
Pursuant to this view, it is no longer necessary for there to be a relationship of trust and 
confidence in order to protect confidential information since “the obligation of 
confidence extends to a wider range of people and is defined by reference to the 
circumstances, not a relationship”.31  Her Honour thought that since the underlying value 
was no longer enforcing the duty of trust arising from a relationship but instead 
concerned protecting confidential information from publication, it followed that a breach 
of confidence occurred not because of a breach of a duty of trust arising out of a 
relationship but because it would rob the person to whom the information relates of their 
right to keep their personal or confidential information private.32  In the case at hand, the 
information was to be considered private because not only was it about participation in 
sexual activity – which is generally regarded a private matter – but was about non-
consenting sexual activity.  The identity of the perpetrator as the plaintiff’s estranged 
husband and the statutory prohibition of publication further supported this conclusion.33  
In the language of English courts, the plaintiff had “a reasonable expectation of privacy” 
in the circumstances. 
                                                  
28








 Ibid [115]. 
33
 Ibid [119]. 
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In relation to the refusal to grant compensatory damages for breach of confidence in 
Giller v Procopets, her Honour noted that the Gillard J had relied on the Court of Appeal 
decision in Campbell v MGN, which had been overturned on appeal by the House of 
Lords with the original orders, including a damages award, reinstated.  He had also 
distinguished Talbot v General TV Corp Pty Ltd,34 where damages were awarded, on the 
ground that in that case the plaintiff had also sought injunctive relief.  However, Hampel 
J did not consider that Talbot was authority for of the proposition that damages could not 
be awarded unless injunctive relief were also sought.35  Instead, the case held that 
damages should be fixed by the method most appropriate to compensate the plaintiff for 
the loss or damage caused by the breach.  It found that there was no single standard 
method for assessing damages for breach of confidence. Her Honour held that in this 
case, which concerned a breach of confidence that caused an affront to the plaintiff’s 
feelings and resulted in personal injury, the most appropriate method of compensation 
was an award of monetary damages for pain and suffering.36 
 
Perhaps the most difficult aspect of Hampel J’s reasoning may be her assumption that the 
developments in the law of breach of confidence in the United Kingdom are “apposite to 
the development of the law here”.37  Whilst her Honour acknowledged that care was 
required when making reference to the United Kingdom cases due to the presence of the 
Human Rights Act 1988, the extent to which she exercised that care is not clear.  That Act 
requires English courts to give effect to the European Convention on Human Rights as far 
as possible when interpreting legislation and developing the common law. The 
Convention’s guarantees of protection for privacy and freedom of expression have played 
the central role in developing the action for breach of confidence in order to provide a 
remedy, in an appropriate case, for a breach of privacy.  They provided the very context 
for the development.  It may therefore be artificial to treat the developments in the action 
                                                  
34
 [1980] VR 224. 
35
 [2007] VCC 281, [140]. 
36
 Ibid [144]-[145]. 
37
 Ibid [110].  
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for breach of confidence as being development of the common law divorced from the 
influence of the Convention.  This is good reason for arguing that these developments in 
the common law in the United Kingdom do not translate the developments in common 
law in this country.  In this connection, it is worth noting that no other member of the 
High Court shared Gleeson CJ’s views. 
 
Instead, Australian courts have a strong history recognising that the basis of the action for 
breach of confidence is the obligation of conscience which binds the confidant,38 
although it has been acknowledged by equity that in certain circumstances third parties 
may also be bound by the obligation.  This is perhaps an acknowledgement of a point 
reflected in Giller v Procopets, namely the orthodox Australian view that while the 
administration of common law and equity has become fused, they are nevertheless based 
upon different systems of justice, or as it is said  “the two streams of jurisprudence, 
though they run in the same channel, run side by side and do not mingle their waters”.39  
This is an important difference in attitude between Australian and English courts. English 
courts, in contrast to their Australian counterparts, would seem to have less difficulty 
accepting a single law of obligations which integrates equity and the common law.40  
 
The prevailing Australian view also makes it more difficult to recover compensatory 
damages for a breach of confidence, particularly in circumstances where without 
forewarning someone in the media disseminates private information so that “the genie is 
out of the bottle” and an injunction is not worth seeking.  It remains to be seen whether 
Hampel J’s interpretation of Talbot v GTV may prevail in light of this attitude or instead 
will be regarded as mere sophistry. 
                                                  
38
 See, eg, Moorgate Tobacco Ltd v Philip Morris Limited (No 2) (1984) 156 CLR 414, 438; Johns v 
Australian Securities Commission (1993) 178 CLR 408. 
39
 See, eg, Felton v Mulligan (1971) 124 CLR 367, 392.  It is worth noting that two current members of the 
High Court, William Gummow and John Heydon, have been or are authors of the foremost text on 
principles of equity, which is a key proponent of this view: see R P Meagher, J D Heydon and M J 
Leeming, Meagher, Gummow and Lehane’s Equity: Doctrines and Remedies (4th ed, 2002).   
40
 See, eg, United Scientific Holdings Ltd v Burnley Borough Council [1978] AC 904, 924-925.  Cf [2007] 
VCC 281, [153] where Hampel J suggested that English courts may share the reluctance to merge common 
law and equity. 
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D Invasion Of Privacy 
 
Hampel J recognised the difficulties associated with merging tortious and equitable 
doctrines when trying to reshape the action for breach of confidence in order for it to 
accommodate breaches of confidence.41  Hampel J was therefore prepared to take the 
“bold step” and also recognise a new tort which provided protection from disclosure of 
private facts as an alternative ground for allowing the plaintiff’s claim for compensation.  
Her Honour noted that Gillard J in Giller v Procopets had declined to recognise privacy 
as allowing recovery in a disclosure-type case on the ground that the law had not 
developed to that point in Australia but had made no reference to Grosse v Purvis, which 
had been decided by that time.42  She observed that if the mere fact that there was no 
previous decision that applied the developing jurisprudence to similar facts operated as a 
bar to recognition, the capacity of the common law to develop to reflect contemporary 
values would be “stultified”.43 
 
However, like Skoien SJDC in Grosse v Purvis, Hampel J did not think it was necessary 
to state an exhaustive definition of the cause of action.  Accordingly, her Honour found 
that an action could lie where there was an unjustified publication of personal 
information which the plaintiff had a reasonable expectation would remain private.  She 
considered “unjustified” to be preferable to “wilful” in this formulation to strike a fair 
balance between freedom of speech and protection of privacy.  Here the reasonable 
expectation of privacy already identified when discussing the breach of confidence claim, 
the statutory prohibition and absence of public interest meant that the defendants had 
breached the plaintiff’s privacy and were liable in damages. 
                                                  
41
 [2007] VCC 281, [153]. 
42
 Ibid [160]. 
43
 Ibid [161]. 
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It is evident, therefore, that Hampel J had in mind recognising a cause of action in the 
case of a disclosure of private information where the plaintiff has a reasonable 
expectation of privacy and there is no countervailing public interest in the disclosure.  It 
is also apparent that her Honour may also see a place for a requirement that the defendant 
must have engaged in behaviour which would be regarded as highly offensive to a 
reasonable person of ordinary sensibilities, although she made no reference to such a test 
in her final analysis.44  This may be because she was satisfied that such a requirement had 
been satisfied in the case before her and therefore was not an issue. 
 
IV  CONCLUSION 
 
All four causes of action relied upon by the plaintiff in Jane Doe v Australian 
Broadcasting Corporation involved some degree of novelty, whether in application of 
existing legal principle or development of new doctrine.  Perhaps least controversial of 
the four was Hampel J’s recognition of an action for breach of statutory duty. 
Notwithstanding the criminal sanction for breach of the statutory prohibition against 
publication of the identifying details of a victim of a sexual offence, the statute clearly 
was designed for the protection of specific individuals who may suffer loss or damage if 
the statutory duty is not observed.  The inference that the statute intended to create a civil 
cause of action in addition to the criminal sanction must therefore be very strong. 
 
Recognition of a duty of care in the circumstances was, it is submitted, a natural 
application of the principles governing recovery of damages for recognisable psychiatric 
illness as established in Tame v New South Wales.  The mere fact that the defendants 
                                                  
44
 See ibid [118] where Hampel J discusses this test in the context of breach of confidence being developed 
to accommodate privacy.  If such a “normality” requirement were recognised there would be an interesting 
contrast with the law of negligence relating to psychiatric injury.  At common law, which still operates in 
Queensland and the Northern Territory, such a requirement has been abandoned: see Tame v New South 
Wales (2002) 211 CLR 317.  However, it has been imposed by statute elsewhere: see Civil Law (Wrongs) 
Act 2002 (ACT), s 34; Civil Liability Act 2002 (NSW), s 32; Civil Liability Act 1936 (SA), s 33; Civil 
Liability Act 2002 (Tas), s 34; Wrongs Act 1958 (Vic), s 72; Civil Liability Act 2002 (WA), s 5S. 
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were a media organisation, a journalist and editor did not automatically provide a policy 
ground for excluding the duty of care since freedom of speech was never a factor that 
could properly be considered.  This was because the statutory prohibition against 
publication meant that there was no relevant freedom of speech in the circumstances.  
Nevertheless the case is significant as being the first to recognise that the media may owe 
a duty of care to a member of the community who may suffer foreseeable harm as a result 
of the media's operations or publications. While of freedom of speech will be an 
important consideration in future cases in which a duty of care is asserted, there may be 
other circumstances where common law or statutory restrictions minimise or exclude its 
effect.  In such cases, there may be good grounds for arguing recognition of a duty of 
care owed by the media. 
 
In upholding the plaintiff’s claim for breach of confidence, her Honour proceeded on the 
assumption that the developments of the common law in the United Kingdom reflected 
developments of the common law in Australia.  In doing so, she perhaps artificially 
excised from those developments the influence of the European Convention on Human 
Rights pursuant to the Human Rights Act 1988.  Without the influence of the convention, 
and with neither a guarantee of free speech nor privacy in Australian law, it cannot be 
assumed that the common law in this country has moved in the same direction as that in 
the United Kingdom.  This is particularly so in light of the strong support in Australian 
cases for the obligation of conscience as being the basis of the action for breach of 
confidence. 
 
Moreover, the doctrinal angst associated with awarding tortious compensatory damages 
for an equitable cause of action may be avoided by the head on development of a specific 
tort protecting privacy, if the threshold question of whether privacy rights should be 
recognised as worthy of protection is answered in the affirmative. The answer to this 
threshold question may lie in the pressure of international developments, and of the ever 
expanding capabilities of technology as a tool for invasions of privacy.  If this is the case, 
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then like Skoein SJDC in Grosse v Purvis before her in another field of privacy, Hampel 
J’s bold step will have been an important first step. 
 
